We explain why the first Galbraith-Petit-Shani-Ti attack on the Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman and the Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation fails in some cases.
Introduction
In 2011, De Feo and Jao [DFJ11] introduced Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH), a post-quantum key exchange protocol that mimics the Diffie-Hellman protocol in the settings of isogenies between supersingular curves. In 2014, Jao, De Feo and Plût [DFJP14] built upon SIDH to obtain a key encapsulation scheme called Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE).
We recently carried out a study of one of the most relevant attacks against SIDH and SIKE, namely the first attack presented in [GPST16] . We call it the Galbraith-Petit-Shani-Ti attack, or GPST. It is an active attack where the attacker impersonates one of the two parties and can recover the static key of the other party in about as many interactions as the number of bits of the key. We will show in Section 2 that the attack may fail in some precise circumstances.
Preliminaries. For an elliptic curve E defined over a field k, we denote the base point of the elliptic curve by O and the modular invariant of E by j(E). The invariant is an element of k that characterizes the k-isomorphism class of E. For P ∈ E(k) rational over k, we denote by P the subgroup of E(k) generated by P .
The parameters of the SIDH protocol, in the form and notation of [GPST16] , are the following:
• A prime p = 2 n 3 m f − 1, where n, m, f are natural numbers, f is small and 2 n ≈ 3 m .
(a) Alice uses a static key (a 1 , a 2 ). The values a 1 , a 2 are elements of Z/2 n Z, not both divisible by 2. (b) The attacker has access to an oracle O such that, if E, E ′ denote supersingular elliptic curves defined over F p 2 and R, S denote any two points on E,
Such an oracle can be realized in practice by having a mechanism in place that ensures the two parties obtain the same shared key.
The attacker does not need any additional information, which makes the GPST attack one of the most powerful attacks known in the literature.
Attacking the attack
Alice's static key (a 1 , a 2 ) is always equivalent (i.e. it leads to the same key exchange) to a key of the form (1, α) or (α, 1), where α is again an element of Z/2 n Z [GPST16, Lemma 2.1]. Without loss of generality, we may assume we are in the former case.
Each iteration of the GPST attack relies on the following implication, used in the paragraph First step of the attack of [GPST16]:
to recover a single bit of the key. In particular, the oracle query (1) is used to recover whether R ′ + αS ′ is equal to R + αS , where R, S, R ′ , S ′ are points on an elliptic curve computed by the attacker. The points R ′ and S ′ are chosen such that R ′ + αS ′ = R + αS implies the i-th bit α i of the key is a zero-bit. Thus, if the oracle returns true, then α i = 0, otherwise α i = 1. However, implication (2) is not correct, because there exist pairs of elliptic curves E 1 , E 2 with multiple isogenies between them. Thus, if φ 1 and φ 2 are distinct cyclic isogenies between E 1 and E 2 and K 1 and K 2 are their respective kernels, we have that E 1 /K 1 is isomorphic to E 1 /K 2 because they are both isomorphic to E 2 , but K 1 and K 2 may not be equal and need not even be isomorphic. Over Q, a classical example can be found in [Sil94, page 110], namely the pair (E, E), where E is the curve defined over Q with j(E) = 8000, which is given by the affine Weierstrass equation y 2 = x 3 + 4x 2 + 2x. This curve E admits a rational 2-isogeny ϕ to itself (hence cyclic, and given explicitly in loc. cit.), and one computes j(E/ ker ϕ) = 8000 = j(E), hence E and E/ ker ϕ are in fact Q-isomorphic, but clearly ker ϕ = {O}.
Over a finite field of characteristic p > 0, if one starts with a supersingular elliptic curve E, then for any prime ℓ = p, for any positive integer m and for any cyclic subgroup G of order ℓ m , the elliptic curve E/G will also be supersingular, because there are still no points of order p on E/G. As there are only finitely many supersingular curves over F p (see for instance [Sil86, Theorem 4.1, pages 148-149]), there exist pairs of cyclic groups (G 1 , G 2 ) where G 1 and G 2 are not isomorphic and such that E/G 1 is isomorphic to E/G 2 . This argument is used to compute the endomorphism ring of supersingular elliptic curves in [Sil86, page 146] (see also [Hus04, page 267] ).
Let us give now a detailed example where the Galbraith-Petit-Shani-Ti attack fails to recover the private key of a SIDH key exchange.
Example 1. Let p = 2 5 3 3 − 1 = 863 be a prime and k be the finite field F p 2 , considered as F p (β), where β satisfies the quadratic equation β 2 − β + 5 = 0. Let E 0 be the supersingular elliptic curve with affine Weierstrass model y 2 = x 3 + (531β + 538)x + (720β + 375) over k. Consider the points P A = (834β + 726, 642β + 130), Q A = (583β + 276, 180β + 854),
Let Alice's key be of the form (1, α), with α = 10 (written in base ten). The value α can also be expressed in bits as 1010 (written in base two). From now on, by a slight abuse of notation we refer to α as the key.
Let us now carry on the Galbraith-Petit-Shani-Ti attack. Assume the randomly generated values b 1 , b 2 are b 1 = 1, b 2 = 6 (for simplicity, we assume b 1 and b 2 stay constant across iterations, but we only need b 1 = 1, b 2 = 6 in the second round for the attack to fail). Let φ A be the isogeny with kernel Note that since the degree of φ B is coprime with the order of P A and Q A , the points R and S have also order 2 5 .
The first iteration of the attack starts by computing Brute-forcing the remaining bits does not yield any solution, since there is no key α ending with two zero-bits (00) such that
The previous example establishes that there exist cases where the attack fails. The following are sufficient conditions (when considered together) for the attack to fail at the i-th iteration of the attack, for 1 ≤ i < n − 3 (the attack brute-forces the last three bits of the key and thus cannot fail after n − 3):
(i) There exist two distinct isogenies φ 1 and φ 2 between E B and E AB .
(ii) One has R + [α]S = P 1 and R ′ i + [α]S ′ i = P 2 , where P 1 and P 2 are generators of the kernel of φ 1 and φ 2 , respectively. (iii) The i-th key bit α i is 1. Determining whether condition (i) is satisfied is computationally hard since it is generally hard to compute isogenies between two given curves. Moreover, the points P 1 and P 2 are dependent on the key α and thus unknown to the attacker. Hence, while the attacker influences the points P 1 and P 2 by choosing φ B , they cannot know whether his choice of φ B would cause the attack to fail.
Condition (ii) ensures that the attack is taking place in the case where the points R and S give rise to the isogenies considered in the first condition. Given the points P 1 , P 2 , we have
). If a θ i exists such that the previous equation is satisfied, then suitable points R and S also exist.
Condition (iii) is necessary because the attack fails by incorrectly deducing a zero-bit instead of a one-bit.
These conditions appear to be quite rare. If it could be shown that the number of cases where the attack fails is polylogarithmic in the security parameter, the attacker could simply retry the attack with different choices of φ B until it succeeds. The attack would still be efficient.
Let us add a remark. Each iteration of the attack depends on the previous one since the modified value R ′ i of iteration i + 1 relies on K i , whose last bit is obtained in the i th iteration. To see how the error propagates, assume the attack fails at iteration i. Thus α i , the i th bit of the key, is a one-bit but the attacker deduces it to be a zero-bit. It follows that K i = K i−1 for the attacker since prepending zero-bits does not affect the value of K. The attacker then computes the points
. Thus, omitting θ since it does not affect the subgroup, we have The subsequent iterations further propagate the error and the oracle will respond false to every further query (unless, again, the isogenies with different kernels have the same codomain, which is believed to be a rare occurrence). Thus, if the attack fails at the i th iteration, all the following key bits are deduced to be a one-bit. This allows the attacker to approximately identify the part of the key that has been correctly deduced and target, with a different choice of φ B , only the remaining part.
Sage Implementation
In this section, we report the source code of a SAGE [S + 09] implementation that shows the attack failing in the case detailed in Example 1. 
